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When it is complete, the Hudson Yards real estate development on the West side of 
Manhattan will be the largest construction project on the island since the Rockefeller 
Centre. It will consist of 16 new skyscrapers, containing office space, around 5,000 
apartments, retail space and a school. Thanks to an alliance between the New York 
City government and New York University named CUSP, it will also be a vast 
laboratory for the study of community relations and social behaviour. Possibilities for 
data collection will be anticipated at the outset, and built into the design of this urban 
environment. CUSP expect to collect data on pedestrian flows, street traffic, air 
quality, energy use, waste disposal, recycling, and health and activity levels of 
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workers and residents. Residents will also be invited to opt in to more intrusive forms 
of surveillance, using their smart-phones and homes. CUSP refers to this as a study 
in 'quantified community'.  
 
Yet the question of why so much data is to be collected may be of secondary 
concern, resting on a misunderstanding of the politics and epistemology of urban 
informatics and contemporary 'Big Data'. The use or benefit of quantified community 
is deemed to emerge only after the surveillance is under way. The President of the 
real estate company building Hudson Yards has said, "I donʼt know what the 
applications might be... But I do know that you canʼt do it without the data.”1 Within 
this epistemology, theoretical presuppositions and hypotheses can allegedly be 
abandoned, along with notions of causality, in favour of blanket surveillance of 
everyday life, out of which new social scientific discoveries will somehow emerge.2 
The Director of CUSP, a physicist by training, has stated that "disciplines will merge 
as a result of the data". In place of the methodological a priori of rival social sciences, 
surveillance allows for a behaviorist agnosticism and algorithmic pattern spotting. 
Once they are 'merged', disciplines will cease to be disciplines of profession, and 
become functions of software: norms of automated data analysis, rather than norms 
of expert conduct.  
 
Few things demonstrate the prescience of Deleuze's 1990 article, 'Postscript on the 
Societies of Control', as well as urban informatics. This case of techno-politics exiting 
"spaces of enclosure" and flooding open spaces and networks offers an acute 
                                                
1 'Huge New York Development Becomes a Data Science Lab', New York Times, 14th April 
2014 
2 Viktor Mayer-Schonberger & Kenneth Cukier, Big Data: A revolution that will transform how 
we live, work and think, London, John Murray, 2013. 
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confirmation of the shift from 'societies of discipline' to 'societies of control' which he 
saw underway. Indeed, he notes that his co-author Felix Guattari: 
 
 “has imagined a city where one would be able to leave one's apartment, one's 
 street, one's neighbourhood, thanks to one's (dividual) electronic card that 
 raises a given barrier; but the card could just as easily be rejected on a given 
 day or between certain hours; what counts is not the barrier but the computer 
 that tracks each person's position - licit or illict - and effects a universal 
 modulation”3   
 
The concept and construction of the 'smart city' has been driven by corporations such 
as IBM, in alliance with city governments, facilitated by the necessarily public-private 
collaborations already established for purposes of 'e-government' projects.4 
Technologies and techniques of 'control' can be dated back to the rise of the railways 
in the mid-19th century, when material goods first started to travel faster than 
people.5 They were refined by corporations, as Deleuze notes, and are now being 
externalized by those same corporations for profit, often with assistance from state 
agencies. Behavioural experimentation and management which first occurred within 
the confines of the corporation (or towards specifically targeted consumer groups) 
can now be carried out across large communities, as news of the controversial 
Facebook mood experiment testified.6     
 
                                                
3 Gilles Deleuze, ʻPostscript on Societies of Controlʼ, October, vol 59, (1992), pp3-7, p7 
4 Rob Kitchin, The Real-time city? Big data and smart urbanism, Geojournal, 79: 1, (2014), 
pp1-14. 
5 James Beniger, The Control Revolution: Technological and Economic Origins of the 
Information Society, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1986. 
6 Adam Kramer, Jamie Guillory, Jeffrey Hancock, ʻExperimental Evidence of Massive-scale 
Emotional Contagion Through Social Networksʼ, Proceedings of the National Academy of 
Sciences, 111: 23, (2014), pp8788-8790 
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Where Deleuze's article is perhaps even more pertinent is in anticipating some of the 
central characteristics of the epistemology and politics of contemporary data 
analytics. In particular, the sense that knowledge and judgement will no longer be 
bound by the strictures of discipline anticipates the 'discipline-free' science of data 
that is celebrated by the likes of CUSP. This has implications for the restructuring 
(possibly, the gradual overcoming) of the social sciences.7 Separate disciplines, 
which date back to the marginal revolution in political economy of the 1870s, may no 
longer retain their authority. Mathematical expertise ('quants') will then hold a general 
epistemological authority, regardless of the empirical matter to being investigated - a 
capacity for "universal modulation" of behaviour, be it human or non-human. Deleuze 
makes a crucial claim about how the chronicity of expert observation is being 
transformed: 
 
 “In the disciplinary societies one was always starting again (from school to the 
 barracks, from the barracks to the factory), while in the societies of control 
 one is never finished with anything... The apparent acquittal of the disciplinary 
 societies (between two incarcerations); and the limitless postponements of 
 the societies of control (in continuous variation) are two very different modes 
 of juridical life, and if our law is hesitant, itself in crisis, it's because we are 
 leaving one and entering another.”8 
  
This is resonant with the radically empiricist, behaviorist epistemology of Big Data, 
which purports to have no methodological a priori, nor any form of necessary 
temporal punctuation. As much data is collected as possible, and then assessments 
can be made in 'real time', as and when they seem useful or vaguely credible. But 
                                                
7 Mike Savage & Roger Burrows, ʻThe Coming Crisis of Empirical Sociologyʼ, Sociology, 41: 5 
(2007), pp885-899 
8 Deleuze, op. cit., p5  
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there is no rhythm at work, in which a methodology is adopted, data is collected, then 
a judgement is delivered. Instead, as the President of the Hudson Yards developers 
indicates, more and more data is collected, and discoveries may or may not follow in 
its wake, at no particular intervals. Those living and working in Hudson Yards will be 
"never finished with anything", thanks to the "limitless postponements of the societies 
of control".   
 
One development which the article does not foresee, however, is one which sits at 
the heart of the Hudson Yards experiment: quantified community. In Guattari's image 
of a smart city, referred to by Deleuze, surveillance is driven by a normative 
distinction between 'licit or illicit' behaviour. Deleuze still assumes that control is a   
"mode of juridical life", the assumption being that it involves judgement of people. But 
current trends in data analytics suggest there is at least as much concern with 
probing, constructing, manipulating and reinforcing social life (for various utilitarian 
purposes of health, wellbeing, sustainability, efficiency, profit etc) as there is in 
imposing norms or defending security. Community is being nudged into a certain type 
of ethical fruition, rather than regulated into conformity, suggesting a form of 'neo-
communitarianism'.9 
 
Associated with the rise of ubiquitous digitisation and Big Data has been a return of 
the 'social', in a new technical, quantifiable and governable guise. This is manifest in 
a host of new modes of expertise and intervention, such as 'social neuroscience', 
'social prescribing', 'social enterprise', 'social media' and so on. In some respects, 
this can be attributed to a trend that Deleuze did recognise, namely the ongoing 
expansion of the corporation as a space of power and life. The 'social' today, in 
                                                
9 William Davies, ʻThe Emerging Neocommunitarianismʼ, Political Quarterly, 83: 4, (2012), 
pp767-776 
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cases such as 'social marketing' or 'social enterprise', sees techniques mastered 
within or for corporations pushed outwards into new spaces. But this still invites 
further theoretical and empirical analysis of how societies of control are politically 
constituted, in the context of long-standing questions regarding the 'social' and its 
relation to the 'economic'. Why have societies of control become manifest as 
societies of sociality?  
 
In this article, I want to use Deleuze's insight about the 'limitless postponements' of 
control societies to consider the re-emergence of the 'social' in the context of 
neoliberalism. It has often been assumed that neoliberalism is a project which seeks 
to eliminate social logics of governance altogether.10 But in the light of Deleuze's 
essay, perhaps we can re-frame neoliberalism as a project which seeks to accelerate 
the shift from discipline to control, in which markets are simply the best available 
technologies for this, with entrepreneurship the idealised mode of subjectivity for the 
control society. With adequate technological facilitation - such as urban informatics - 
social relations are no less amenable to this shift than market relations. The result is 
a form of sociality which is perpetually incomplete, just as prices are perpetually 
seeking some ultimate judgement, never quite reached. To explore these issues, I 
draw on the 'sociology of critique', as developed by Boltanski and Thevenot, and ask 
what forms of knowledge and theory are involved in performing the transition from 
discipline to control. While Deleuzeʼs article does not address neoliberalism, nor use 
the term, it potentially casts valuable light on questions of neoliberalism, indicating 
the ways in which neoliberal thinkers (such as Hayek) were implicitly critical of 
discipline, and advocates for control.  
 
                                                
10 Nikolas Rose, ʻThe Death of the Social? Re-figuring the territory of governmentʼ, Economy 
& Society, 25: 3, (1996), pp327-356 
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I argue, by way of conclusion, that control societies (like corporations) rest on diverse 
assumptions about the capacity of individuals to cope with uncertainty and 
indeterminacy. Everyone who dwells in a control society must cope with an absence 
of conclusive judgement or clear rules. But, mitigating this, some inhabit 
environments (such as Hudson Yards) which are designed to steer them in certain 
directions, whereas others are possessed of a more political form of indeterminacy, 
as the executives of technologies and infrastructures. This division may turn out to be 
the crucial political faultline of societies of control.  
 
 
Critical and uncritical knowledge 
 
Societies of control, as Deleuze depicts them, have no clear demarcations. They are 
endlessly joined up, in a "continuous network". To live in a control society is to 'surf' 
through time, never settling within any enclosure or arriving at any destination. 
"Perpetual training tends to replace the school, and continuous control to replace the 
examination".11 The control society offers freedom from the constraints and 
judgments of delimited institutions, on which the disciplinary society had depended. 
But the disciplinary society at least offered a certain rhythm, periodically releasing 
individuals from the expert gaze, once they had passed a given test or through a 
given institution. "Control is short-term and of rapid rates of turnover," he argues, "but 
also continuous and without limit, while discipline was of long duration, infinite and 
discontinuous. Man is no longer man enclosed, but man in debt".12  
 
                                                
11 Deleuze, op. cit., p5. 
12 Ibid., p6. 
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Freedom, as it existed in the disciplinary society, was the freedom to be periodically 
judged and then released, at least until the next trial or examination came along. 
During the period between two trials, disciplinary societies are regulated as matters 
of social and economic fact, which keep doubt at bay. This pertains at various scales 
of expert knowledge and governmental rationality. For example, the question of 
macroeconomic performance is settled every three months with the production of 
GDP figures, allowing a certain freedom for policy-makers and economic agents to 
act without constant uncertainty. In Deleuze's example, those in school are examined 
at regular intervals, granting them periods of time when their ability is not in doubt. 
Techniques of audit, which emerged in the late 19th century to allow shareholders to 
evaluate corporate managers, have since become a central tool of new public 
management. These involve reports, targets, evaluations and scores, all of which 
involve a certain non-continuous rhythm or ritual.13  
 
In their pragmatic analysis of critical knowledge, Boltanski and Thevenot stress the 
way in which critical situations interrupt ordinary stable social relations. To ask 'who 
caused this car accident?' or 'how intelligent is this pupil?' or 'has this hospital 
satisfied its patients?' is to depart temporarily from normal conduct, and to reach 
outside of it in search of some principle or measure of judgement. Such a principle or 
measure must transcend the limited circumstances where it is to be applied. They 
argue that "those situations are necessarily transitory because they break the 
ordinary course of action. Nobody can live constantly in a state of crisis".14 It is worth 
remembering that the term crisis originally held various overlapping meanings, of 
judgement, decision or turning point; things are put to the test, and then resume 
                                                
13 Michael Power, The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
1997. 
14 Luc Boltanski & Laurent Thevenot, ʻThe Sociology of Critical Capacityʼ, European Journal of 
Social Theory, 2: 3, (1999), pp359-377, p360 
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some normality (possibly a new normality). In any case, it involves the appearance of 
uncertainty (be it of a moral, empirical or political form), which requires some higher 
principle to be found so as to be resolved. "One of the ways to get out of a crisis is to 
return to an agreement", which means seeking some shared value or principle that is 
external to the dispute.15 Crisis ends when some limited consensus is found, be it 
moral or empirical.  
 
What Boltanski and Thevenot suggest is that the same formal structure of 
crisis/critique is found at various scales (between the macro and the micro) and at 
various levels of power and authority (between the 'expert' and the everyday). The 
rhythm of crisis afflicts capitalism itself, whereby a regime of accumulation can 
persist for decades, before its inadequacies become matters of widespread social, 
political and economic concern, generating a crisis, as regulation theorists have 
explored.16 It is a feature of critical theory, which seeks to actively generate crisis 
through directing judgement upon issues that were otherwise overlooked or accepted 
as fact. It is also how positive social sciences proceed, whereby theories dictate the 
sorts of data that are gathered (e.g. psychologists conduct surveys on 'attitudes'), 
data is collected, questions are asked, answers are given, and then a new set of 
facts is established. And, as Boltanski and Thevenot stress, it is how we go about 
everyday situations, whenever there is a dispute as to how to proceed: if two people 
disagree as to who should do the washing up, they can only move on once they've 
agreed the principle that is at stake, and applied it to the case at hand.   
 
In each case, doubt arises, becoming eventually impossible to ignore, a principle of 
decision/evaluation is found, and then it is employed to re-establish some agreed-
                                                
15 Boltanski & Thevenot, op. cit. p360 
16 Robert Boyer, The Regulation School: A Critical Introduction, New York, Columbia 
University Press, 1989 
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upon normality or socio-economic reality. What this account suggests is that the 
temporal structure of discipline is embedded in a more fundamental temporality of 
modernity itself. The foundational example of this critical temporality would be 
Descartes' sudden moment of existential crisis, resolved thanks to the thinking mind.  
 
If we consider Boltanski and Thevenotʼs sociology of critique alongside Deleuzeʼs 
depiction of control, some significant contrasts of existential temporality become 
apparent. In its permanent, uninterrupted quality, the control society might appear to 
require individuals to live “constantly in a state of crisis”, in a way that Boltanski and 
Thevenot deem impossible. At least, technologies of control mean that matters of 
ʻfactʼ and states of ʻuncertaintyʼ are constantly bleeding into one another. The status 
of ʻcrisisʼ as a form of interruption is downgraded by societies of control. Is the 
denizen of the control society living “constantly in a state of crisis”, or are they 
engulfed by some alternative temporality altogether? How, for example, will the 
residents of Hudson Yards cope with the 'limitless postponement' of the evaluation 
being conducted on their community? One answer to this is that the society of 
discipline is not being replaced as such, but being supplemented. Indeed, Deleuze's 
claim that the society of discipline "succeeded that of the societies of sovereignty" is 
possibly an exaggeration.17 Foucault himself argued: 
 
 “We should not see things as the replacement of a society of sovereignty by a 
 society of discipline, and then of a society of discipline by a society, say, of 
 government. In fact we have a triangle: sovereignty, discipline and 
                                                
17 Deleuze, op. cit. p3. 
 11 
 governmental management, which has population as its main target and 
 apparatuses of security as its essential mechanism.”18 
   
By the same token, we should not see things as the replacement of societies of 
discipline with those of control, but a layering of the latter upon the former. 
Institutions of discipline - hospital, school, etc - have not disappeared, and are indeed 
subject to ever newer forms of meta-disciplinary power, as manifest in new public 
management. Yet it is also clear that the pressure on such institutions is being dealt 
with through, for example, the teaching of 'wellbeing' behaviours, which aim to 
reduce pressure on medical or social services. An alliance between discipline and 
control is what emerges. 
 
It is not the case that the inhabitant of the control society is never conclusively 
judged, known, or evaluated. The endurance of disciplinary institutions suggests that 
critical and epistemological elements of modernity still pertain. Yet experts and non-
experts are increasingly reliant on forms of knowledge and decision-making which do 
not result in any stable agreement or facts. They lack what Boltanski and Thevenot 
characterise as a transitory capacity to interrupt. In terms of the representation of 
data, this might be witnessed in the supplementation of reports (the product of audit) 
with dashboards (real-time representations), where the latter are able to permeate far 
more parts of everyday life. The report is still published quarterly; but the dashboard 
indicators of health, wellbeing, stock market performance, weather, twitter sentiment 
is constant, and consequently harder to escape or ignore for any period of time. City 
                                                
18 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory & Population: Lectures at the College de France, 1977-
78, Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2007, pp108-108 
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dashboards are one example of how real-time data is coming to represent everyday 
life as a constant flux.19 
 
Perhaps the reason why societies of control are existentially tolerable (in a way that 
ʻconstant crisisʼ is not, according to Boltanski and Thevenot) is that the knowledge 
that they produce is not really critical knowledge at all, but a form of uncritical 
knowledge. This is knowledge which lacks a transcendental or methodological a 
priori, but is instead intuited in a radically empirical or affective sense. Precisely 
because it lacks the temporal rhythm of crisis/critique - stability, doubt, judgement, 
stability - it is not possible for such knowledge to ever cast any judgement over us. 
Instead, judgement and doubt are fused into an epistemological orientation which 
probes uncertainty, in search of pragmatic responses. In place of the facts produced 
by audit, social science, statistics and discipline, there is the observation that certain 
things seem to be happening. If my iPad dashboard tells me that traffic seems to be 
building up around Oxford Circus, I will take a different route. If recycling levels in 
Hudson Yards seem to be declining, an experimental intervention can take place 
aimed at nudging the community towards different behaviour.  
 
Critical knowledge, resting on a rational, disembodied Cartesian ego, involves a 
withdrawal from a situation in search of certainty. The pursuit of such knowledge is, 
as Weber saw, a necessarily lonely experience.20 Uncritical knowledge is affective, 
embodied and immersed in real-time. In his critical account of Big Data epistemology, 
Andrejevic argues that in an age where there are more pieces of data than humans 
                                                
19 Rob Kitchin, Tracey Lauriault, Gavin McArdle, ʻKnowing and governing cities through urban 
indicators, city benchmarking and real-time dashboardsʼ, Regional Studies, Regional Science, 
2: 1, pp6-28 
20 Max Weber, ʻScience as a Vocationʼ in H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: 
Essays in Sociology, London: Routledge, pp. 129-156 
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are able to cognitively process, 'post-comprehension' strategies become central.21 
Decisions become attributed to our bodies (most often our brains), calculations 
become entangled with emotions, communication becomes a function of our faces 
and sentiments. The individual is merely 'surfing', as Deleuze notes, between 
different situations but never pausing in search of a judgement or an objective 
perspective. This is a new form of empiricism, which is oriented towards an emergent 
future, meaning that it cannot be held to the same epistemological standards as 
already-existing empirical facts. As Amoore argues, it aims “to preempt an unfolding 
and emergent event in relation to an array of possible projected futures”, making it 
ʻpossibilisticʼ, not ʻprobabilisticʼ.22 
 
Deleuze's reference to control as the 'modulation' of behaviour is absolutely right. But 
his description of it as a new 'mode of juridical life' is potentially misleading, implying 
as it does that transitory moments of critical judgement are involved. Living under 
control is not so much to inhabit 'constant crisis' - an oxymoron - but to inhabit 
'constant emergency'. Situations become exceptional, in the sense described by 
Schmitt and Agamben, being neither inside nor outside of rules, but in an uncritical 
zone "where inside and outside do not exclude each other but rather blur with each 
other".23 Similarly control societies blur the distinction between 'right' and 'wrong' 
conduct, which is so critical to disciplinary societies. 'Nudges' based on behavioural 
economics, for example, do not seek normative rationality, but the right form of 
irrationality. Crises come to an end. Exceptions, on the other hand, are temporal in 
nature, but needn't be time limited, and can endure to the point of permanence.  
                                                
21 Mark Andrejevic, InfoGlut: How too much information is changing the way we think and 
know, New York, Routledge, pp141-142. 
22 Louise Amoore, The Politics of Possibility: Risk and Security Beyond Probability, North 
Carolina, Duke University Press, 2013, p7. 
23 Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, Chicago, Ill, Chicago University Press, 2005, p23. 
Itallics added.  
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The uncritical entrepreneur 
 
We can glean from Deleuze's essay that societies of control have their origins at the 
turn of the 20th century, but only become really visible with the crisis of Fordist 
capitalism in the 1970s. He notes that the organisational archetype of control 
societies is the corporation (an artifact of the late 19th century) and that Kafka's The 
Trial (written in 1914-15) occupies "the pivotal point" between discipline and control. 
A worthy addition to this account, who will help connect it to the question of 
neoliberalism, is Hayek. In particular, Hayek makes a sustained attack on scientific, 
Cartesian forms of social knowledge, which privilege facts, statistics and objectivity, 
and stresses the value of perspectival, embodied knowledge that intellectuals have 
tended to devalue. In this respect, we can view Hayek as a defender of the form of 
'uncritical knowledge' which is instrumental to how control societies operate. 
 
In 'The Use of Knowledge in Society', Hayek poses the question of why we venerate 
knowledge that can be easily centralised or distributed as a matter of expertise, while 
overlooking those forms of knowledge that are necessarily local and hard to share.24 
Economists and policy-makers suffer from an epistemological perspective that 
privileges aggregates and stable representations, at the expense of particular details 
and dynamic situations. Statistics and disciplinary social science are accused of 
obscuring the ways in which economic activity actually takes place, which is thanks 
to the acquired skills and instincts of managers and entrepreneurs acting on the 
basis of practical knowledge. They 'know how', rather than 'know that', or in 
                                                
24 Friedrich Hayek, ʻThe Use of Knowledge in Societyʼ, The American Economic Review, 35: 
4, (1945), pp519-530 
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Heidegger's formulation, encounter a world which is zuhanden rather than 
vorhanden.25 
 
The elevation of intellectual, social scientific perspectives over those of 
entrepreneurs and practitioners would be inconsequential, for Hayek, were it not for 
the fact that capitalism itself is a dynamic system. This had already been highlighted 
by Mises as the central reason why socialist planning could not succeed: socialist 
tools of accounting are static, whereas human needs and tastes are dynamic.26 To 
put that in today's jargon, the perceived problem of socialism was that its accounting 
mechanisms would never be 'real time'. Mises even accepted that socialist planning 
could be entirely efficient, if only industrial society reached some 'steady state', but 
this is anathema to capitalism.27 Statisticians, planners and social scientists (all 
equally dangerous, as far as Hayek was concerned) were imposing an a priori 
rationality on a complex adaptive system. Hayek argued: 
 
 “If we can agree that the economic problem of society is mainly one of rapid 
 adaptation to changes in the particular circumstances of time and place, it 
 would seem to follow that the ultimate decisions must be left to the people 
 who are familiar with these circumstances, who know directly of the relevant 
 changes and of the resources immediately available to meet them.”28 
 
Viewed against the backdrop of Deleuze's essay, Hayek's epistemology can be read 
as an attack on the formal conditions of the society of discipline, indeed a 
considerable amount of his writing during the 1940s was dedicated to deconstructing 
                                                
25 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, Oxford, Blackwell, 1962. 
26 Ludwig von Mises, Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth, Alabama, Ludwig 
von Mises Institute, 1990. 
27 Mises, op. cit. p16. 
28 Hayek, op. cit. p524. 
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the authority claims of professional social scientists.29 The sense that capitalism 
involves constant uninterrupted change, whereas formal expertise (such as that of 
the statistician) involves a periodic construction of facts, is treated as the 
fundamental reason why the latter's aspiration to socio-economic representation 
must fail. Forms of uncritical, non-representational knowledge, as embodied in the 
businessman, must therefore become instrumental in an economy not dominated by 
a priori ideas. Policy-makers will rediscover their juridical authority when they give up 
seeking objective social knowledge altogether.30 This is a ground-clearing exercise, 
which opens up political and epistemological territory to be occupied by technologies 
and techniques of control.  
 
As becomes even more explicit in the work of Schumpeter during this time, the virtue 
of entrepreneurship is its capacity to over-ride normative divisions of discipline, 
profession and scientific specialism. The entrepreneur acts instinctively, without 
adequate facts at his disposal, and discovers whether or not his actions were 
worthwhile or not. The mind-set is one of strategy, that is, of navigating an uncertain 
situation, rather than one of judgement, evaluation or critique:  
 
 “As military action must be taken in a given strategic position even if all the 
 data potentially procurable are not available, so also in economic life action 
 must be taken without working out all the details of what is to be done. Here 
                                                
29 Friedrich Hayek, ʻScientism and the Study of Society, Part 1ʼ, Economica, 9: 35, (1942), 
pp9-35; Friedrich Hayek, ʻThe Facts of the Social Sciencesʼ, Ethics, 54: 1, (1943), pp1-13; 
Friedrich Hayek, ʻThe Intellectuals and Socialismʼ, The University of Chicago Law Review, 
Spring 1949, pp417-433 
30 Friedrich Hayek, The Road to Serfdom. London, Routledge, (1944), p80. 
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 the success of everything depends upon intuition, the capacity of seeing 
 things in a way which afterwards proves to be true.”31 
 
In place of scientific discipline and method, a plurality of competing perspectives 
serves as a means of pursuing truths, which are never ultimately grasped. In Hayek's 
terms, competition is a 'discovery process' that lacks any destination.32 In order for 
this to work epistemologically, a priori conditions and principles of knowledge need to 
be abandoned. That in turn means dispensing with professional disciplines, tests and 
strictures of governmentality, in favour of an immanent, constant stream of 
sensations.  
 
The ideal-typical entrepreneur is therefore a peculiar type of radical empiricist. He 
makes no theoretical generalisations, but nor does he build up a careful empirical 
picture of the world inductively either. He is constantly launching himself upon the 
future in a state of ignorance, scarcely taking the time to look at the past in search of 
lessons either. Having only intuition, embodied knowledge and the specifics of a 
given time and place, he remains constantly in this somewhat idiotic position of trying 
things out, but never reaching any firm conclusions as to whether they really worked. 
As Foucault argued, this becomes the model for a more generalised form of 
neoliberal subjectivity, once individual conduct is modeled upon the immanent, 
uncritical, strategic behaviour of enterprise.33 
 
                                                
31 Joseph Schumpeter, The Theory of Economic Development, New Brunswick, Transaction 
Publishers, 2008, p85. 
32 Friedrich Hayek, ʻCompetition as a Discovery Processʼ, The Quarterly Journal of Austrian 
Economics, 5: 3, (2002) pp9-23 
33 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, 1978-79, 
Basingstoke, Palgrave MacMillan, 2008. 
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Where Schumpeter was more anthropologically sophisticated than his neoliberal 
contemporaries was in recognising that only a small minority of people can dwell in 
this existential state. Rather than deal in common psychological or anthropological 
attributes, as Mises, Hayek and the later Chicago School were in various ways, 
Schumpeter was interested in heroic elites.34 Certain exceptional leaders or 
entrepreneurs would navigate uncertainty, without resort to evidence or norms, but 
the majority of people needed rules and rationality, that is, they were reliant on 
discipline. This accounts for his pessimism regarding the future of capitalism, which 
he believed would eventually become submerged under bureaucratic procedures (the 
society of discipline), and eventually into socialism. 
 
What none of these Austrian economists remarked on was that, between instinctive 
entrepreneurship and socialist bureaucracy, a third option was also emerging during 
the 1920s and '30s, which we have come to associate with the notion of control. 
These were the techniques of behavioural and affective influence, that were quickly 
imported into corporate marketing and human resource management.35 Within the 
reaches of corporate control, individuals could behave instinctively and uncritically - 
just like the entrepreneur - but without the lonely existential burden (or the disruptive 
threat) carried by the entrepreneur. Behaviorism relieves ordinary people of 
Cartesian rationality or critical autonomy, handing responsibility over to the 
architects, designers and scientists who shape the social environment. The rise of 
social psychology during the 1930s, and its subsequent instrumentalisation, meant 
that corporations could begin to produce and harness horizontal relationships, 
teamwork and intimacy. It wasn't until the post-1950s Chicago School that an 
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explicitly pro-corporate neoliberal position would emerge, though even this gave no 
account of how corporations achieved control.36 I will return to this important vacancy 
in neoliberal thought in the Conclusion.   
 
 
Socialist discipline vs market control 
 
Neoliberal thought has its earliest origins in 1920s, as a critique of the very possibility 
of efficient socialism.37 By depicting substantively rational goals as (instrumentally) 
'irrational', Mises depicted all ethical claims about collective action or collective needs 
as matters of personal taste or guesswork. Building upon this, Hayek expressed 
deep suspicion of the very idea of the 'social' as a domain of human life, and 
represented sociology and socialism as ways in which intellectuals sought to impose 
their own goals upon the collective. The idea of the 'social' was therefore a construct 
of the elite methodologies and theories through which it was rendered objective. It is 
produced by 'specialists'.38  
 
By contrast, the price system is a form of quantitative representation which has no a 
priori theories or methodologies. It is not dependent on disciplines or intellectuals in 
any way, but emerges spontaneously from the distributed behaviour of consumers 
and entrepreneurs. More importantly, it is a communication system, which channels 
knowledge between those various actors. Hayek is quite explicit about the role of 
price as a form of information and communication technology: 
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 “It is more than a metaphor to describe the price system as a kind of 
 machinery for registering change, or a system of telecommunications which 
 enables individual producers to watch merely the movement of a few 
 pointers, as an engineer might watch the hands of a few dials, in order to 
 adjust their activities to changes of which they may never know more than 
 is reflected in the price movement.”39  
 
The great advantage of market price, over other forms of social representation, is 
that nobody 'consciously' determines it. There is no judge, expert or critic, employing 
their specialist disciplinary methods, who establishes what a 'correct' or 'fair' or 
'objective' price is. In that sense, the price system offers an escape from Cartesian 
and objective forms of socio-economic knowledge, which Hayek viewed as the basis 
of political tyranny.  
 
Especially thanks to later Chicago School manifestations of neoliberal thought, 
neoliberalism has frequently been associated with 'economic imperialism'.40 By 
viewing all action as, fundamentally, economic in nature, both Mises and Hayek 
might be described as 'economic imperialists'. Hayek himself argued that "there is no 
separate economic motive", a claim that is integral to the work of Chicago School 
scholars such as Becker. 'Social' questions can be abandoned, if they are simply 
reframed as 'economic' ones, hence even informal social ties can be evaluated in 
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terms of the quest for instrumental efficiency.41 Given the relentless attacks on 
sociology, socialism, social policy and social democracy, neoliberalism has 
understandably been viewed as a project of strategic dismantling of the very idea of 
the 'social', as an empirical, governable domain.42 Along these lines, Rose has 
suggested that the 'social', as "the sum of the bonds and relations between 
individuals and events - economic, moral, political - within a more or less bounded 
territory governed by its own laws", was born in the mid-19th century, but went into 
terminal decline in the late 20th century.43   
 
But if we consider Hayek's argument against the historical backdrop described by 
Deleuze, the political project of neoliberalism comes to appear subtly different. It is 
no longer about seeking to colonise the 'social' with the 'economic', or striving to 
replace collective action with markets. But rather, it is about rolling back instruments 
of discipline, and making way for instruments of control, of which the price system is 
the pre-eminent example, but no more than that. The price mechanism, as Hayek 
depicts it, possesses all of the attributes which Deleuze attributes to societies of 
control. It is a constant, inconclusive, real-time, computational, immanent 
representation, which enables constant 'modulation' of behaviour. It does not exist in 
an enclosed space; on the contrary, it connects up distributed actors and institutions, 
as "a system of telecommunications". In contrast to the rhythm of discipline (which, 
as I've highlighted, is the same rhythm of crisis), price has no interruptions or 
punctuation, but is in constant motion. There is no human judge, specialist or critical 
actor involved in the creation of prices. Nor is there any obvious moment when to 
accept a price as 'correct' or 'just'. As happens to law in the state of exception, the 
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'right' and the 'wrong' price "blur with each other". From a Hayekian perspective (as 
opposed to the rationalism of Chicago School neo-classical economics), the only way 
to know when to act on a price is to trust in one's entrepreneurial-consumer instinct, 
which is affective and embodied. Just as with the contemporary epistemology of Big 
Data, price indicates what seems to be happening. It is a technology for what has 
since come to be known as 'now-casting'.  
 
Likewise, the Hayekian critique of socialism and social science is specifically that it 
depends entirely on regimes of discipline. The disciplines of the social sciences are 
required to survey and objectify the public, produce statistics and organise data 
collection.44 The disciplines of bureaucracy are required to administer the allocation 
of resources. From around 1870 onwards, social democratic government introduced 
new disciplinary institutions and policies, of universal education, healthcare, social 
policies, aided by the 'specialists' from progressive institutions such as the London 
School of Economics. The opposition which Hayek draws between 'liberals' and their 
enemies is not as simple as individualism vs. collectivism, or economisation vs 
socialisation. Rather, it maps perfectly onto Deleuze's distinction between societies of 
discipline and societies of control. At the same time, it is an argument over political 
epistemology, whether to trust the critical objectivity of the expert, or the uncritical 
instinct of the entrepreneur. 
 
One of the successes of this reinvention of market liberalism was that many 
socialists have felt compelled to argue on its own terms, that is, to explain how 
socialism could operate via technologies of control.45 In establishing the socialist 
accounting debate as a debate about real-time complex calculation, as Mises did, 
                                                
44 Hayek, 1942, op. cit. 
45 David Steele, From Marx to Mises: Post Capitalist Society and the Challenge of Economic 
Calculation, London, PGW, 1992 
 23 
socialist arguments moved away from a defence of disciplinary institutions (where 
they were strongest), and towards an enquiry into radically new and unproven 
technologies of control. Thus, the possibility of socialism became a question about 
adequate computing and telecommunications power, rather than adequate scientific 
or political authority of policy-makers themselves. Recent surges in computational 
power have therefore seen the case for socialism made once more, only now with 
scarce surviving socialist authorities available to implement such technologies, were 
they ever proven.46 
 
 
The limits of control under actually existing neoliberalism 
 
The globalisation and computerisation of financial markets from the late 1960s 
onwards was amongst the main reasons why the Fordist-Keynesian model of 
capitalism (with its national, analogue systems of capital regulation) was unable to 
survive. Digitised financial markets come as close as any to approaching the 
Hayekian ideal of information-processing, and in doing so, the apogee of the control 
society. As Crary has lamented, the world of finance lacks any interruption, not even 
from sleep, seeing as it spans the entire globe and operates in a constant real-time 
flow.47 Along with the time, the date and the weather, the present state of financial 
markets is now data that is almost impossible to ignore in post-industrial societies, 
seeing as it runs across TV screens, digital matrix systems in urban centres, the 
'dashboards' of smart phones and tablets, and so on.  
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To live with this constant stream of fluctuating prices is to live in a state of constant 
anxiety, regarding what they mean and how (or whether) to respond. This is an acute 
case of the "limitless postponements of the societies of control", "no longer man 
enclosed, but man in debt".48 Crucially, for the political economy of 'actually existing' 
neoliberalism from the 1970s onwards, this includes states, who come to operate 
under the constant, non-specific threat that they might be punished by financial 
markets. While credit-rating agencies work through the traditional discipline of 
economic analysis, critical evaluations and published reports, this is really an effort to 
anticipate the more pervasive, indeterminate, uncritical control which is exerted by 
financial markets over political institutions.  
 
Personal finance is also a basis for control.49 The combined effects of financial 
deregulation and increased computing power means that credit is no longer offered 
on the basis of any identifiable judgement (for instance, through a conversation with 
a bank manager), as it was in the society of discipline. There is no single test of 
credit-worthiness under this 'actually existing' neoliberalism, and consequently 
nothing to actually fail at. Rather, all available knowledge about the person is 
combined from various sources, to establish what terms credit will be provided. The 
criteria of assessment are obscure, although they are multiplying rapidly thanks to 
ubiquitous digitization: the British online pay-day lender, Wonga, boasts of using 
8,000 data points when assessing a borrower.50  
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It is undoubtedly the case that neoliberalism brings more and more areas of life 
under the controlling technology of financial markets.51 But the history of 'actually 
existing' neoliberalism since the 1970s also demonstrates the limits of control via 
markets. Hayek, in common with most European neoliberals of the 1930s and '40s, 
believed that markets could only allocate specific types of goods, and a form of 
collective welfare provision was necessary outside of these limits.52 Where price was 
not in effect, disciplinary institutions would be necessary instead. A progressive 
manifestation of this would be the 'social market' model, combining high levels of 
public provision with strict neoliberal policies in relation to anti-trust and monetary 
regulation.53 But a more influential alternative has been to use the disciplinary power 
of accounting, management and economics as a perpetual critique of state, society 
and public.54 Hence, actually existing neoliberalism has witnessed both increased 
power for control by financial markets, and increased power for discipline by audit, 
risk assessment, cost-benefit analysis, appraisal, evaluation, customer satisfaction 
surveys, target-setting and so on. What Foucauldian scholars characterised during 
the 1990s as 'advanced liberalism', manifest in governance, governmentality and 
endless risk management, suggested that the society of discipline (at various social 
scales) was still in rude health.55   
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In its historical practice, therefore, neoliberalism has involved an expansion of the 
scope of disciplinary technique, precisely so as to open up new possibilities for 
control by financial market. Post-2008 austerity measures, for example, have 
involved more acute forms of discipline placed upon public services, welfare 
claimants and government finances, out of a generalised feeling that this is what 
financial markets 'want'. But of course it is in the nature of the constant, fluctuating 
nature of markets that they never reach a judgement on this one way or the other. As 
Streeck argues, "much as 'the markets' want clarity from governments, they are not 
prepared to give it themselves".56 When discipline and control combine in this way, 
the relationship is sharply asymmetrical, indeed parasitical. We might further 
challenge Deleuze's assumption that 'control societies' are succeeding 'disciplinary 
societies', and suggest instead that the former are sucking the energy and power 
from the latter, but nevertheless depend on them.  
 
On the other hand, the disciplinary techniques that were adopted and invented under 
applied neoliberalism were typically extracted from or inspired by the domain of 
power which Deleuze saw as providing the logic of the control society, namely the 
corporation. 'New public management' began by adopting the more rationalist, 
disciplinary techniques of corporate management, as they had developed from the 
1950s onwards.57 The endless auditing of public services suggested that they were 
quasi-corporations, in which taxpayers (or bond-holders) were the shareholders. The 
reinvention of the state as a corporation, which must aim for 'competitiveness' in 
everything it did, involved critical, expert techniques of discipline. These were not 
disciplines of the 'social', as attacked by Hayek, but disciplines of enterprise. 
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Neoliberal 'governance' principally involved reinventing non-market actors as 
'enterprising'.  
 
The metaphor that a nation is a 'corporation', its politicians the 'managers' and the 
President its 'CEO' was a largely metaphorical exercise, conducted by business 
gurus and think tanks.58 But arguably it was a crucial step towards a more complete 
shift into a society of control, than the digitisation and globalisation of financial 
markets was adequate to achieve. Once the population is viewed as a corporation 
and political institutions as 'brands', then the next step may be to employ the same 
techniques of control that corporations have been using since the 1920s, in order to 
'modulate' behaviour in a constant, uncritical fashion. This is what we now witness in 
the return of the 'social', as something which can be quantified, nudged, mined and 
probed. In an age of ubiquitous digitisation and algorithmic data analytics, the same 
anti-disciplinary qualities which Hayek applauded in the price system are now 
manifest in non-market social relations.  
 
 
Conclusion: the chronic social 
 
One way of understanding what is happening to social relations today, as they 
become digitised, quantified and analysed, is that they are taking on the 
phenomenology of financial markets. Quantification of relationships, affects and 
behaviours is happening in real-time, very often in ways that can be seen and studied 
by those whose data is gathered. 'Feeds' and 'streams' of 'social' data now flow 
through digital displays in an equally interminable, liquid fashion as financial prices 
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have done on TV screens and dot matrix displays since the 1980s. City dashboards 
offer plural, real-time indicators of weather, traffic, financial markets and twitter 
sentiment/trends, all in a single place. If neoliberalism is viewed only as 
'marketisation', 'individualism' or 'economic imperialism', then we might argue that 
social relations have reappeared as private goods to be priced and consumed.  
 
But this misses a feature of the 'social' today, which Deleuze's essay helps us to 
interrogate, namely its chronic nature. The 'social' that Hayek criticised belonged to 
the societies of discipline, involving the production of facts. This meant that it 
possessed its own punctuation: evaluations, measurements, disciplinary social 
sciences, norms. It had tests and procedures, to be followed, including both the 
methodologies involved in representing it by experts, and the practices which 
individuals were required to follow as members of this 19th century model of 'society'. 
By contrast, the 'social' that is emerging today, in cases such as the Quantified 
Community of New York's Hudson Yards, is one that lacks critical moments or tests. 
It generates no facts, but only sensory impressions.   
 
The return of the 'social' represents a new phase in the project of neoliberalism, that 
affirms a Hayekian commitment to technologies of control. Neoliberal critique has 
often appeared resolutely hostile to the very idea of the 'social' but, as I have argued, 
this hostility was really aimed at the specialists, the disciplinarians, the social 
scientists, the methodologists, who rendered the social world 'objective'. Their 
technologies of knowledge were critically abstracted from the dynamic world which 
they sought to represent. By contrast, the age of social media, urban informatics and 
social analytics is one in which relationships, friendship, crowds and community are 
technologies that can perform a similar role to money and prices. To say that the 
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social is therefore being 'priced', 'sold', 'economised' or 'commodified' is too 
simplistic. On the contrary, the new technicity of the 'social' may represent a genuine 
challenge to the role of money and price as forms of calculation, holding out 
possibilities for radically new forms of valuation and resource allocation.59 Suddenly 
the 'social' has acquired a visibility which is no longer dependent on social theories, 
discipline or methodologies, meaning that it now displays the dynamic 
phenomenological and epistemological qualities which Hayek sought to rescue from 
the perceived threat of disciplinary socialism.  
 
In this epistemological and phenomenological sense, both the inhabitant and the 
analyst of a 'quantified community' can now dwell in the same state of constant 
anxious fluidity as a financial trader or an entrepreneur. If the 1979-2008 phase of 
'actually existing' neoliberalism depended heavily on techniques of discipline in order 
to establish a global financial stream of control, perhaps the new phase of 
neoliberalism will gradually roll back the disciplinary society once and for all. Even 
those who do not work in the higher reaches of finance or corporate business will 
gradually learn the entrepreneurial art of what Schumpeter termed "seeing things in a 
way which afterwards proves to be true". A utopian vision of a control society, 
present in Hayek's theory of price, in paeans to the 'network society', and in 
boosterish accounts of urban informatics, would see this as the goal: the end of 
discipline, the end of specialism and the end of critique. 
 
Can we avoid the seduction of this vision, without simply appealing to the sanctity of 
past discipline, like Weberian throwbacks? In stressing the importance of the 
corporation to societies of control, Deleuze at least gives us a clue as to how we 
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might do so. The utopian vision of control societies assumes that everybody can be 
simultaneously 'smart' and 'dumb' in an identical way. Everybody is taking decisions, 
the whole time, neither obeying nor disobeying, just modulating and being 
modulated. Nobody is really in charge of a system that lacks any institutional 
boundaries or routines, nor can anyone sit outside of it as a pure observer. Financial 
markets provide a paradigmatic case of this type of control technology.  
 
But if the corporation is viewed as the paradigm of control, rather than the market, 
various types of political inequality start to become visible. Schumpeter was fully 
aware that only a tiny minority of people could cope psychologically with a life of 
constant surfing, without rules or discipline: these people were leaders and 
entrepreneurs. Others needed rationalist structures and norms which they could 
inhabit. In practice, corporations made increasing use of behaviorist and affective 
techniques to manage employees and consumers, rather than bureaucratic 
discipline. This facilitated the ideological illusion that the consumer, middle manager 
or the employee was just as autonomous and heroic as the CEO or the entrepreneur; 
everyone is a leader. Yet the very fact that consumers, middle managers and 
employees are subjected to constant surveillance, behaviorist experimentation, 
emotional monitoring and manipulation, is an indication that the corporation is a 
dualistic political entity, involving two different forms of affective orientation. There is 
strategic leadership for a small coterie of executives; there is behaviorism for 
everybody else. As the corporation has become financialised, two parallel sets of 
control technologies are at work side by side, scarcely ever touching each other. 
Executives must orient themselves emotionally in the face of constantly moving 
financial markets. Everyone else must orient themselves emotionally in the face of 
constantly moving brands, symbols and affective interventions. If Hayek saw the 
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virtue of the market in making everyone equally smart and equally dumb at the same 
time, the virtue of the corporation is that it makes a small minority unusually smart, 
and the vast majority unusually dumb, with some gradations in between. 
 
Deleuze suggests that this same political and epistemological project is now being 
projected outwards, beyond the limits of the corporation, across society at large. The 
adoption by governments of behaviorist tools, such as 'nudges', Cognitive 
Behavioural Therapy and 'social marketing', appears to confirm that he was right. 
Ubiquitous surveillance and Big Data allows techniques of corporate power to flood 
spaces that were previously beyond rationalisation, even by markets. While all of this 
may be suffocating, it is also potentially more politicising than a society dominated by 
discipline. In a disciplinary society, a judgement or methodology was enacted, a 
conclusion was reached, and that was the end of the matter. The facts were 
established, and people moved on. But where such resolution is never achieved, 
decision-making has nowhere to hide. While the data ideologues continue to argue 
that we no longer need managers or experts, merely machines for interrogating data, 
serious sociological analysis would explore the ways in which consultants, 
contractors, IT companies, software engineers are ever more reliant on decisions, 
because numbers are no longer capable of settling disputes in the way Boltanski and 
Thevenot explore. These are not the consumer 'decisions' beloved of behaviorists, 
but the executive decisions taken by the architects of control technologies. These 
decisions do not go on in public, and these experts have largely inherited the same 
invisibility that the disciplinary societies granted to bureaucrats. Their lack of clear 
accreditations or specialism, their peculiarly fact-free empiricism, their lack of any 
clear measures of evaluation and their constant, far-reaching meddling in everyday 
life, means that one great challenge for critical theory in such societies of control is 
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how to avoid falling into conspiracy theory. In addition to the "limitless 
postponements" of this epoch there is also the sense, born out of widespread 
behaviorist experimentation, that social reality (for instance, the built environment) 
has been designed around the needs of corporate managers and finance.    
 
The most urgent objects of critical analysis, in control societies, are the divergent 
assumptions that are constantly being made about our capacity to cope with 
freedom, which then become embedded into technological infrastructures. We may 
all be 'entrepreneurs', 'surfing' through networks, never stopping to comprehend or to 
criticise, simply deciding and steering. But as infrastructures become 'smarter', so it 
becomes possible to hand over more decision-making power to the social 
environment, to the point where even consumer choices can be delivered 
'predictively' on the basis of sensors and algorithms.60 It is not just that people are 
placed in multiple different consumer niches; they are granted different degrees of 
autonomy, based upon existential distinctions regarding their capacity to cope with 
the sheer indeterminacy of the control society.  
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